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NOTE
LORILLARD TOBACCO V. REILLY: ARE WE
PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE COMMERCIAL FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE AT THE RISK OF HARMING
OUR YOUTH?
David S. Modzeleskti
The First Amendment provides citizens certain fundamental rights,
including the right to free speech.' However, while the amendment
appears clear on its face, the Supreme Court has historically struggled
with how much protection it affords commercial speech. This is
especially evident in the Court's analysis of free speech claims brought by
companies who seek to advertise their vice products, such as tobacco.'
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.; see also Robert
A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the First Amendment," 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457, 470-71 (1991) (outlining significant First Amendment
principles, including "the principle of content neutrality" and "the principle of protection
of offensive speech"); Donald E. Lively, The First Amendment and Its Third Century:
Reckoning with the Ravages of Time, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 259, 263-64 (1991).
Lively states:
The First Amendment, like other constitutional rights and liberties, has evolved
as a relative rather than absolute guarantee. Its defeasible nature is manifested
not only in jurisprudence, which candidly endorses content and media regulation
in diverse circumstances, but in limiting principles that convert even purported
absolutism into a bounded rather than unchecked notion. Justice Black, perhaps
the foremost exponent of unequivocal first amendment liberty, ultimately if not
admittedly demonstrated that lines must be drawn with respect to the
guarantee's actual meaning. Black's distinction between speech and conduct and
the exclusion of symbolic expression may have charted different constitutional
perimeters than the Court etched, but the analysis was no less qualifying of
freedom in both function and effect.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,532 (2001).
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In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,3 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether tobacco companies have a constitutional right to advertise
certain products around schools and playgrounds.4 Specifically, the
petitioners, a group of cigarette, smokeless tobacco and cigar
manufacturers and sellers, challenged regulations implemented by the
Massachusetts Attorney General which were designed to combat
underage cigarette smoking and tobacco use, as well as unfair and
deceptive packaging of cigars.5 The petitioners filed suit in U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming that the regulations
violated the Supremacy Clause6 and the First and Fourteenth
3. Id.
4. Id. at 532. The Court also considered "whether certain cigarette advertising
regulations are pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq." Id. Devoting much time
and effort to the preemption issue, the Court eventually held that the Massachusetts
regulations were preempted by the FCLAA and therefore in violation of the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 540, 550-51. Section 1331 of the FCLAA states:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising
with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby -
(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects
of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of
cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations
with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
5. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 532 (citing MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940 § 21.01 (2000)).
Section 21.01 states:
The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgates 940 CMR 21.00 relating to
cigarette and smokeless tobacco product manufacturers and retailers pursuant to
his authority in M.G.L. c. 93A, § 2(c). The purpose of 940 CMIR 21.00 is to
eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products are marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts in order to address
the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under
legal age. 940 CMR 21.00 imposes requirements and restrictions on the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products in Massachusetts in
order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940 § 21.01 (2000).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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Amendments of the federal Constitution The district court concluded
that the Massachusetts regulations were constitutional because they were
not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA) and they satisfied the four-part test applicable to commercial
speech.8
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's preemption ruling.9 The court held that the regulations were not
preempted by the FCLAA since the FCLAA's "pre-emption provision is
ambiguous" and provides for the preemption of cigarette advertising's
content and not its location.' ° Likewise, with respect to the First
Amendment claim, the First Circuit held that the outdoor advertising
regulations did not violate the First Amendment because Massachusetts
had a substantial interest in preventing children from using tobacco
products."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a five to
four decision, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the First
Circuit's holding. 2 In short, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
held that "[lt]o the extent that federal law and the First Amendment do
not prohibit state action, States and localities remain free to combat the
problem of underage tobacco use by appropriate means."' 3  Justice
O'Connor, however, reaffirmed the notion that the First Amendment
entitles tobacco companies to advertise truthful information about their
products to adult customers that have an interest in the information.
4
7. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 536-37.
& Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 537-38. The four-part test was outlined by the Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pubic Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
The Central Hudson test is used by the Court to analyze commercial free speech claims
under the First Amendment. Id. at 566. Consisting of four parts, the Court considers
whether (1) the proscribed expression is protected by the First Amendment; (2) the
asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. Id.
9. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 538-39.
10. Id. at 539.
11. Id. (concluding that "the outdoor advertising regulations restrict no more speech
than necessary, reasoning that the distance chosen by the Attorney General is the sort of
determination better suited for legislative and executive decision makers than courts").
The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision to invalidate the point-of-sale
advertising regulations. Id. The court concluded that the Attorney General was "better
suited" to determine which regulations were necessary. Id.
12. Id. at 540, 571.
13. id. at 571.
14. Id.
20021
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In his partial concurrence, Justice Thomas stated that strict scrutiny
should be applied to any legislation where the government "seeks to
restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys"
regardless of whether the character of the speech is commercial or
private. 15  Justice Thomas stated that the regulations failed Central
Hudson's intermediate level of scrutiny test and reasoned that a higher
level of scrutiny was necessary since Massachusetts instituted its
regulations to control the content of the tobacco companies'
advertising. 6
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the preemption issue in the case)
7
Justice Stevens largely agreed with the majority's analysis and conclusion
of the First Amendment issue.'8 He did note, however, that the First
Amendment issue relating to the "1,000 foot rule" should be remanded
for further factual findings. 9 In his view, the Court should determine to
15. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting
that he would subject all of the advertising restrictions to "strict scrutiny" and find that
they violate the First Amendment).
16. Id. at 574-77 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating
that strict scrutiny applies, in particular, to content-based regulations of speech).
17. Id. at 590-91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that the FCLAA's
preemption provision precludes states and localities from regulating the location of
cigarette advertising).
1& Id. at 599 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
19. Id. (referring to the "1,000 foot rule" codified in MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§
21.04(5)(a), 22.06(5)(a) (2000)). Section 21.04(5) refers to advertising restrictions of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco:
(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in 940 CMR 21.04(6), it shall be
an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer
to engage in any of the following practices:
(a) Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed stadiums and
advertising from within a retail establishment that is directed toward or visible
from the outside of the establishment, in any location that is within a 1,000 foot
radius of any public playground, playground area in a public park, elementary
school or secondary school;
(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products any
portion of which is placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail
establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of any public
playground, playground area in a public park, elementary school or secondary
school, and which is not an adult-only retail establishment.
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940 § 21.04(5)(2000).
Section 22.06(5) refers to the advertising restrictions on cigars:
(5) Advertising Restrictions. Except as provided in 940 CMR 21.06(6), it shall be
an unfair or deceptive act or practice for any manufacturer, distributor or retailer
to engage in any of the following practices:
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what extent such a rule "prohibits cigarette advertising in a substantial
portion of Massachusetts' . . . cities." 20
This Note examines the evolution of case law surrounding the First
Amendment as it relates to the commercial free speech doctrine. This
Note first sets forth the standard by which commercial free speech claims
are evaluated. Next, this Note analyzes the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly and explains that
the majority correctly determined that the regulations implemented by
the Massachusetts Attorney General violated the commercial free speech
doctrine under the Central Hudson test. Then, this Note analyzes the
minority opinion, as it relates to the First Amendment issue, and
concludes that it too reinforces the validity and soundness of the Central
Hudson standard and strength of the commercial free speech doctrine.
Finally, this Note considers the implications of the Court's decision on
both tobacco companies and society in general. This Note concludes that
the Lorillard decision does not merely reaffirm the soundness of the
Central Hudson standard, but also highlights the need for consistency in
regulating potentially harmful products. This Note further concludes
that states maintain constitutionally sound alternatives to protect their
youth from the harmful effects of tobacco use.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE COMMERCIAL
FREE SPEECH
A. The Supreme Court's Early Jurisprudence on the Commercial Free
Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court first addressed the commercial free speech
doctrine in 1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen,2' where it held that the First
(a) Outdoor advertising of cigars or little cigars, including advertising in
enclosed stadiums and advertising from within a retail establishment that is
directed toward or visible from the outside of the establishment, in any location
within a 1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground area in a public
park, elementary school or secondary school;
(b) Point-of-sale advertising of cigars or little cigars any portion of which is
placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is
located within a one thousand foot radius of any public playground, playground
area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school, and which is not an
adult-only retail establishment.
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940 § 22.06(5) (2000).
20. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
21. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2002]
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Amendment did not protect commercial advertising.2 The Valentine
Court considered a First Amendment challenge made by Chrestensen, a
decommissioned Navy submarine owner, who wanted to distribute
printed handbill advertisements for tours of his boat in the streets of New
York City. 3 The city's Police Commissioner informed Chrestensen that
the activity violated the city's Sanitary Code.2 Upon being told that he
could distribute handbills designed only for informational purposes or
public protest, Chrestensen altered his double-faced handbills.2 He
removed any indication of an admission fee and added a protest against
the City's Dock Department related to their refusal to allow him to
exhibit his submarine.26 The police department advised Chrestensen that
while the distribution of a bill containing only the protest did not violate
the city's Sanitary Code, his double-faced bill was still prohibited because
it contained a commercial advertisement for the submarine. Despite
the police department's advisement, Chrestensen proceeded to print and
distribute his double-faced bill, and was subsequently arrested by the
police for violating the city's Sanitary Code.28 Chrestensen brought suit
against the city alleging the code violated his First Amendment right to
press and free speech. 29
22. Id. at 54.
23. Id. at 52-53, 55; see also Scott Sullivan, Tobacco Talk. Why FDA Tobacco
Advertising Restrictions Violate the First Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 753-
54 (1997) (reviewing the facts in Valentine and noting that the Valentine Court "excepted
commercial speech from First Amendment protection" without considering the
"farreaching implications" of the decision).
24. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53. The New York City Sanitary Code forbids the
distribution of "commercial and business advertising matter." Id. Section 318 of the
Sanitary Code reads:
Handbills, card and circulars. - No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or cause
or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet,
placard or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public
place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any
hall of any building, or in a letter box therein; provided that nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any
such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit the distribution of
sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual
subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of
anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id. (quoting New York Sanitary Code).
25. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52.
26. Id.
27. Id. The protest that was deemed acceptable was a protest against the action of
the City Dock Department for refusing to grant Chrestensen wharfage facilities at a city
pier to exhibit his submarine. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 54. The respondent, Chrestensen, brought suit to
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly
In a remarkably brief opinion, Justice Roberts considered whether the
application of the city's Sanitary Code was an unconstitutional
abridgement of Chrestensen's First Amendment rights 1 The Court
stated that the streets are proper places for the exercise of free
communication of information and opinions, and that states and
municipalities may not unduly regulate such a privilege in the public
interest.31 However, the Court also held that the Constitution does not
prevent states and municipalities from regulating commercial
advertising.32 Because Justice Roberts cited no authority to support such
a conclusion, scholars have proffered that the holding in Valentine merely
reflected the "prevailing societal attitude" that advertising constituted a
business in need of regulation
33 and not a "form of free expression."
M
Despite the absence of authority to support its opinion, the Valentine
decision boldly held that the First Amendment did not protect
commercial speech and advertising.35
enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the distribution. In his complaint he
alleged diversity of citizenship; an amount in controversy in excess of $3,000; the
acts and threats of the petitioner under the purported authority of § 318; asserted
a consequent violation of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution;
and prayed an injunction.
Id.
30. Id. at 51-55. The very brief opinion consisted of approximately three pages of
text and three footnotes. Id. In Valentine, the Court cited no supporting case law to draw
its conclusions or further its analysis. Id.
31. Id. at 54.
32 Id. Justice Roberts further stated "[w]hether, and to what extent, one may
promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be
adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment." Id.
33. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 753-54 (stating that "[t]he brief, puzzling opinion
may have been the result of the prevailing societal attitude that advertising was a business
subject to regulation rather than a form of free expression") (citing Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv.
747, 749 (1993) (explaining that there are practical problems with the First Amendment
given its brevity, and a lack of explanation as to what is considered "speech," "freedom,"
and "abridging")).
34. Id. at 754.
35. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54-55. The Court reasoned:
The question is not whether the legislative body may interfere with the harmless
pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must permit such pursuit by what it
deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference with, the full and free use of
the highways by the people in fulfillment of the public use to which streets are
dedicated. If the respondent was attempting to use the streets of New York by
distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition of the code provision was
lawfully invoked against his conduct.
2002]
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Nine years later, in Breard v. Alexandria,6 the Court revisited the
commercial free speech doctrine announced in Valentine.37 The Court
considered the validity of an Alexandria, Louisiana ordinance that
prohibited Jack H. Breard from soliciting subscriptions for magazines
without obtaining the prior consent of the owners he solicited.38
Recognizing the tension between the homeowner's desire for privacy and
the publisher's right to distribute its publications, the Court reasoned
that communities which have found house-to-house solicitors intrusive
and burdensome may prohibit such methods of sale by ordinance.39
Thus, the Court concluded that Alexandria's ordinance did not violate
Breard's rights under the First Amendment and upheld Breard's
conviction for violating the statute.4°
The Breard decision is noteworthy because, while the holding is
consistent with the Valentine decision, the Court in Breard recognized
that solicitors do possess a right to distribute information.41 Quoting the42
Court's reasoning in Martin v. Struthers, the Court stated "[f]reedom to
distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is
so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside
reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of
distribution, it must be fully preserved." 43 Although the Court found this
right to be outweighed by the city's interest in protecting its residents, the
36. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
37. Id. at 624.
3& Id.
39. Id. at 644-45 (noting that the constitutionality of Alexandria's ordinance depends
upon a "balancing of the conveniences between some householders' desire for privacy" as
well as the "publisher's right to distribute publications in the precise way that those
soliciting for him think brings the best results").
40. Id. at 645 (finding that there was no abridgement of First Amendment principles
in the ordinance). Justice Reed concluded that it would be a misuse of the "great
guarantees of free speech and free press to use those guarantees to force a community to
admit the solicitors of publications to the home premises of its residents." Id.
41. Id. at 641-42 (reasoning that while money-making activities of the solicitor do not
entitle entitle him to go "in or upon private residences" at will, distribution of periodicals
through door-to-door canvassing is protected under the First-Amendment). The Court
also stated, "[w]e agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond
the protection of the First Amendment. The selling, however, brings into the transaction a
commercial feature." Id. at 642.
42. 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (finding that an ordinance which prevented Jehovah's
Witnesses from going to door-to-door to distribute leaflets advertising a religious meeting
conflicted with the freedom of speech and press provided for under the Constitution).
43. Breard, 341 U.S. at 643 (quoting Martin, 319 U.S. at 146-47).
[Vol. 51:987
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Breard decision marked the first step in overturning the harsh rule
announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen."
B. The Court Ultimately Acknowledges Commercial Free Speech
Protection
In the years following Valentine and Breard, the Court reconsidered
the notion that commercial free speech was not protected under the First
Amendment. For instance, in 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia,45 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that made it illegal
to sell or circulate any publication encouraging or prompting the
procuring of an abortion.46 Relying on Pittsburg Press Co. v. Commission
on Human Relations,47 the Court rejected the assumption made by the
Supreme Court of Virginia that the First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial
advertisements. 48 In fact, the Court reasoned that prior Court cases,
including Pittsburgh Press, had clearly established that speech "is not
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in
[commercial] form."49  Moreover, the Bigelow Court found that
advertisements which contain commercial material or reflect the
advertiser's commercial interests "did not negate all First Amendment
guarantees." Ultimately, the Bigelow Court held that the Virginia
courts erred in their assumptions that advertising was not entitled to First
Amendment protection and held that commercial advertising is in fact
afforded constitutional protection under the First Amendment." Thus,
44. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 754-55) (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498,514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
45. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
46. Id. at 811.
47. 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973) (holding that advertisements were afforded First
Amendment protection).
48. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Bigelow Court compared the abortion advertisement with the
advertisements involved in Chrestensen and Pittsburgh Press. Id. at 821-22. The Court
noted "important differences" between the abortion advertisements and the
advertisements in the earlier cases. Id. at 821. For example, the abortion advertisement
"did more than simply propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 822. In fact, "[i]t
contained factual material of clear 'public interest.' Portions of its message, most
prominently the lines, 'Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency
requirements,' involve the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion." Id.
51. Id. at 825-26.
2002]
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Bigelow stands as the Court's first recognition that commercial speech is
in fact a constitutionally protected activity.52
Less than one year later, the Court heard arguments in another
commercial free speech case. 53 This time, the scope of protection the
First Amendment afforded commercial speech was an issue squarely
before the Court.-4 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Virginia statute declaring a licensed pharmacist's
advertisement of prescription drug prices to be unprofessional conduct.5
Justice Blackmun's opinion succinctly held that a state may not
completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity because complete suppression
might have negative implications. 6 In reaching this conclusion, the
majority noted that "speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid
advertisement of one form or another., 57  The Court observed that
consumers maintain a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information, 8 and in some circumstances that interest is stronger than
their interest in political speech 9.5  Finally, the Court held that while the
First Amendment does not prohibit the State from ensuring that
commercial information flows without restraint, the First Amendment
does protect consumers from highly paternalistic regulations6 The
Court reasoned that an alternative to paternalistic regulation is "to
52. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 757-58 (citing Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824-25). In
Bigelow, Justice Blackmun stated that a state "may seek to disseminate information so as
to enable its citizens to make better informed decisions when they leave." Bigelow, 421
U.S. at 824-25. Under "the guise of exercising internal police powers," however, a state
may not bar a citizen from "disseminating information about an activity that is legal" in
the state. Id.
53. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
54. Id. at 758,760-61.
55. Id. at 749-50.
56. Id. at 773.
57. Id. at 761 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun further stated that "[s]peech
likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit, and even
though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money."
Id. (citations omitted).
5& Id. at 764 (maintaining that while not all commercial messages contain a "public
interest element," such an element could be added to such messages).
59. Id. at 763. Justice Blackmun stated, "[a]s to the particular consumer's interest in
the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far,
than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id.
60. Id. at 770.
[Vol. 51:987
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assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.",6' In short, the Court in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decidedly distanced itself from the
Valentine decision by concluding that First Amendment protection
extends to commercial speech.62
Despite the Court's recognition of the commercial free speech doctrine
in several cases, it was not until 1980, when the Court considered Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,63 that it set
forth a four-prong test to determine whether regulation of commercial
speech violates the First Amendment. 64 To determine whether the First
Amendment protects the expression at issue, the reviewing court would
first consider whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleadingi6 Second, the Court must consider whether the government's
interest in regulating the speech is substantial.66 If both questions yield
positive responses, the Court would consider the third prong of the test -
whether the regulation directly and materially advances the
governmental interest asserted. 67  Finally, the government must
demonstrate that their regulations are not more extensive than necessary
to serve their interest.68 In short, if the government cannot satisfy each
part of the test, then it cannot regulate the commercial expression in
accordance with the First Amendment.
The Central Hudson Court applied its four-part test to a New York
regulation of the Public Service Commission, which completely banned
promotional advertising by an electrical utility company. 69 The purpose
61. Id.
62. See Lori Ann Luka, The Tobacco Industry and the First Amendment: An Analysis
of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 297, 299-300 (2000). Luka
concludes that "[t]he Court refused to accept the State's paternalistic approach, forbidding
it from completely suppressing the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity because it was fearful of the information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients." Id. at 300.
63. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
64. Id. at 566.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Luka, supra note 62, at 308 (discussing the third prong of the Central
Hudson test).
68. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
69. Id. at 558; see also Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco
Advertising: A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 99, 110-11 (1988)
(outlining the Central Hudson test and describing the Court's application of that test).
2002]
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of the regulation was to ensure that fuel stocks were conserved for the
1973-1974 winter. 7°  Three years later, the Commission sought to
continue the ban on promotional advertising and requested feedback
from the public.7' Despite opposition by Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation and suggestions that the ban would foster only "piecemeal
conservationism," the Commission maintained the restriction because it
would likely dampen unnecessary growth in the energy consumption.
2
The Central Hudson Court ultimately held that the Commission's total
ban on promotional advertising did not pass the four-part test.73  The
Court concluded that the speech at issue concerned an entirely lawful
and non-misleading activity, and reasoned that the energy regulation
promoting conservation represented a substantial governmental interest,
therefore satisfying the first two prongs of the inquiry.74 Likewise,
because the Commission could establish a definite link between
advertising and demand for electricity, the third part of the inquiry was
satisfied.7" Nevertheless, the Court held that the regulation failed to
satisfy the fourth part of the test because the Commission's order
affected all promotional advertising "regardless of the impact of the
touted service on overall energy use., 76  The Court noted that the
Commission failed to offer evidence that more limited regulations would
not adequately serve the state's energy conservation interests.77 In short,
Central Hudson represented a methodical attempt by the Court to
70. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559.
71. Id. Despite the opposition, the Commission extended the prohibition in a policy
statement which was issued on February 25, 1977. Id. The policy statement was divided
into two parts. Id. The two parts were: (1) promotional advertising "intended to stimulate
the purchase of utility services," and (2) a broader category named "institutional and
informational [advertising]," which were not intended to promote sales. Id.
72 Id. at 559-60.
73. Id. at 572 (noting that the failure of meeting the four-part test lies in a lack of
proof that the total ban was "no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state
interest").
74. Id. at 566-69.
75. Id. at 569. The Court held that there was "an immediate connection between
advertising and demand for electricity." Id. Given that "Central Hudson would not
contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales,"
there is a "direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Commission's
order." Id.
76. Id. at 570. The Court reasoned that "the energy conservation rationale, as
important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about electric devices or services
that would cause no net increase in total energy use." Id.
77. Id.
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identify the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to commercial free
speech regulations.78
C. The Court's Application of Central Hudson and the Recent Trend
Toward Heightened Commercial Free Speech Protection
In the cases following Central Hudson, the Supreme Court has
inconsistently applied the Central Hudson test.79 In some instances, the
Court has granted significant First Amendment protection to commercial
speech by striking down efforts by states to interfere with free
commercial expression." But, on other occasions the Court has upheld
commercial speech regulations imposed by states.81
For example, in 1986, in Posadas v. Tourism Co., the Court held that
legislatures are afforded some deference in establishing ordinances."
The Court examined the constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute that
prohibited advertising casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico."
Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court concluded that the statute
met each prong of the four-part test."' Specifically, the Court noted that
the Puerto Rico statute satisfied the Central Hudson test because it
involved advertising of casino gambling, which is a lawful activity, and
78. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 760 (stating that Central Hudson set forth a
"general scheme" to permit the restrictions on false and misleading advertisements, while
preventing overbroad commercial advertisement regulation by states). But see Howard K.
Jeruchimowitz, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech Balancing: A Potential
Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82 CORNELL L.
REv. 432, 435, 447 (1997) (explaining that the courts have misapplied Central Hudson and
reasoning that the Supreme Court should strengthen the Central Hudson standard to
"better protect truthful, nonmisleading advertising of lawful products... .
79. See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 761.
80. Id. (referring to the Court striking down bans "on residential 'for sale' signs, news
racks dispensing commercial handbills, and in-person soliciting by Florida accountants")
(internal citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Posadas v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 330-31 (1986); see also Gary
Weeks, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico: Promising
Precedent for Proponents of Tobacco Advertising Prohibition?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 877, 877-
78 (1987). Weeks observed that "[t]he ultimate impact of the Posadas decision on the
issue of whether an absolute ban on the advertising of tobacco products would violate first
amendment protection for commercial speech remains to be seen." Id. at 877. Weeks
further explained, "[h]owever, should this issue be presented to the courts for
adjudication, Posadas may prove to be promising precedent for the proponents of the
tobacco advertising prohibition." Id.
82. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 330-31, 344.
83. Id. at 330.
84. Id. at 344; see also Clara Sue Ross, Pushing Puffing Post-Posadas, 56 U. C1N. L.
REv. 1461, 1473-77 (1988) (explaining through thorough discussion the application of the
Central Hudson test in Posadas and examining the implications of the Posadas decision on
tobacco advertising).
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because Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in restricting advertising
where gambling arguably produces serious harmful effects in society,
including organized crime and prostitution." The Court also found that
Puerto Rico's restrictions "directly advanced" its asserted interest in
preventing an increase in crime since the legislature separately classified
casino gambling for the advertising regulations." Finally, the Posadas
Court held that the advertising restrictions were not more extensive than
85. Id. at 341.
86. Id. at 342-43; see also Weeks, supra note 81, at 889. Weeks concluded that
Posadas should probably not be dismissed "as a mere judicial aberration in the still
evolving field of commercial speech," but rather as an "important shift in the Court's
position on the extent to which commercial speech will continue to enjoy first amendment
privileges." Id. Specifically, Weeks stated:
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia Pharmacy to extend first
amendment protection to include commercial speech, and the more recent
decisions by the Court reached under the Central Hudson criteria, the Posadas
decision may have come as a surprise to those familiar with the development of
the commercial speech doctrine. In Posadas, the Court held that the government
has the constitutional right to suppress truthful commercial speech in order to
discourage its residents from engaging in lawful activity. Certainly, Central
Hudson places some restrictions on this right. Posadas, therefore, is not a
reaffirmation of the Chrestensen role which afforded commercial speech no
constitutional protection. It may, however, prove to be a significant step in that
direction.
Id. at 888-89.
In drawing his conclusion on Posadas, Weeks referred to several decisions that had just
been released at the time of his analysis. Id. at 883 n.42. For example, he considered
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), where the
Court considered whether a public utilities commission can require a privately-owned
utility company "to include in its billing envelopes speech of a third party with which the
utility disagrees." Id. at 4. The Court held that such an order by the commission
impermissibly burdened the rights of the utility company because it forced the company to
"associate with the views of other speakers," and because "it selects the other speakers on
the basis of their viewpoints." Id. at 20-21. Weeks also considered Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), where the Court held that advertising of
contraceptives is commercial speech and is protected from unwarranted governmental
interference. Id. at 72-73. Moreover, Weeks looked at New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982), where the Court held that a New York statute, which precluded the distribution of
material that depicts sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen, did not
violate the First Amendment because New York could constitutionally prohibit
dissemination of material that amounted mainly to child pornography. Id. at 749, 773-74.
Weeks also cited Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489 (1982), where the Court held that commercial speech is subject to governmental
regulation where the underlying activity is illegal. Id. at 496-97. Moreover, Weeks looked
at Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), where the Court found that
commercial speech appearing on outdoor advertising displays were subject to
governmental regulation because a substantial state interest was involved. Id. at 507-09.
Similarly, Weeks considered Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 530 (1980), where the Court concluded that a newsletter inserted by a public utility
into its billing envelopes was entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 532, 544.
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necessary to serve their governmental interest since the restrictions
would only affect Puerto Rico's residents and not tourists."
Consistent with Posadas, the Court remained relatively deferential to
the government in United States v. Edge Broadcasting.8 In Edge
Broadcasting, the Court upheld federal statutes that restricted
broadcasters, licensed in states that did not permit lotteries, from
advertising other states' lotteries." The Court noted that "the statutes
directly advanced the governmental interest at stake in this case," and
the truthful information could not be restricted by government
regulations.0
Most recently, the Court has opted not to defer to legislatures'
judgments as they pertain to commercial speech, but instead to promote
heightened commercial free speech protection under the Central Hudson
test. For example, in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,91 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance which prohibited the
distribution of "commercial publications through freestanding newsracks
located on public property."' Applying the Central Hudson test, the
Court deemed the ordinance unconstitutional since it was not "narrowly
tailored" to the city's interest in maintaining the attractive appearance of
the city's public areas.93 The Court concluded that a "categorical ban on
the distribution, via newsrack, of 'commercial handbills"' could not be
reconciled with the First Amendment because the city offered no
87. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343.
88. 509 U.S. 418 (1993); see also Jeruchimowitz, supra note 78, at 446.
89. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 428.
90. Id.; see also Jeruchimowitz, supra note 78, at 446-47. Jeruchimowitz explained
that the Court in Edge Broadcasting likely followed Posadas for one of two reasons. Id. at
447. The Court either had a "desire to adhere to a deferential standard of review in
regulating broadcast licensees," or it had a "desire to apply a deferential standard of
review to commercial speech restrictions on advertisements which promote harmful
products or activities." Id. Above all else, however, Jeruchimowitz found that the Court
distanced itself from the position that a state could, under no circumstances, suppress
advertisements of truthful information by instituting "paternalistic regulations." Id.
91. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
92. Id. at 412. The Cincinnati ordinance was designed to promote the safety and
attractive appearance of city streets and sidewalks. Id.; see also Martin H. Redish,
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 623-24 (1996) ("In
Discovery Network, the Court found an absence of a reasonable fit between the City's
prohibition of newsracks distributing commercial newspapers and its asserted interest in
aesthetics, because the commercial newsracks 'are no greater an eyesore than the
newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati's sidewalks."').
93. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430. Justice Stevens further noted that Cincinnati
failed to justify their enactment of a "sweeping ban that bars from its sidewalks a whole
class of constitutionally protected speech." Id.
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distinction between commercial handbills and newspapers.94 The Court
held that Cincinnati had no constitutional right to bar an entire class of
constitutionally protected speech.9
The Court continued its trend toward striking down state regulations
in Rubin v. Coors.96 Specifically, the Coors Court considered whether a
beer company should be permitted to label and advertise the alcohol
content of its product.97 In finding that provisions in the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act98 precluded such labeling and advertising and
therefore violated the First Amendment, the Court focused on the final
three prongs of the Central Hudson test. 9 In finding that the bar on
labeling failed the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test,'0°
the Court concluded that the restriction "cannot directly and materially
advance its asserted interest because the overall irrationality of the
Government's regulatory scheme."' ' With regard to the fourth prong of
the test, the government failed to utilize "less intrusive" and
constitutionally sound alternatives. ""
Like Coors, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island"°3 represents another
effort by the Court to ensure that the First Amendment affords
commercial speech adequate protection.'O4 In 44 Liquormart, the Court
considered the constitutionality of Rhode Island's ban against liquor
stores advertising retail prices of their alcohol products.05 In concluding
that such a ban abridges "speech protected by the First Amendment,"
the Court reaffirmed the notion that commercial free speech is afforded
significant protection under the First Amendment.'
94. Id. at 430-31.
95. Id.
96. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
97. Id. at 478.
98. 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
99. Coors, 514 U.S. at 483.
100. Id. at 483.
101. Id. at 488.
102 Id. at 490-91.
103. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
104. Id. at 516 (describing a state's burden in justifying a ban on price advertising); see
also Redish, supra note 92, at 622. Redish criticizes the First Circuit's deferential holding
in 44 Liquormart, which found that ban to be inconsistent with Coors. Id. Redish argued
that "[tlhe Court concluded that '[tihe Government did not offer any convincing evidence
that the labeling ban has inhibited strength wars.' The 44 Liquormart court clearly did not
demand that the government supply such 'convincing evidence' to support its ban." Id.
105. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489.
106. Id. at 489; see also Sullivan, supra note 23, at 762 (writing that 44 Liquormart was
a continuation of "the trend toward more protection for commercial speech"). Sullivan
noted that the "fallout" from the plurality opinions in 44 Liquormart "calls into question
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II. LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. v. REILLY: THREE SIGNIFICANT
OPINIONS, ONE FIRST AMENDMENT MESSAGE
Forty-six states entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
in November 1998 to reduce and discourage underage tobacco use.' °7
whether the Court will continue to use the Central Hudson test." Id. at 764. Regardless,
44 Liquormart "illustrates that commercial speech now enjoys more First Amendment
protection than it ever has." Id.
107. See generally Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://
www.naag.org. Nearly all of the fifty states entered into the MSA, including the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See id. The MSA's language regarding outdoor
tobacco advertisements included the following:
Advertisement. Each Participating Manufacturer shall discontinue Outdoor
Advertising and Transit Advertisements advertising Tobacco Products within the
Settling States as set forth herein.
(1) Removal. Except as otherwise provided in this section, each
Participating Manufacturer shall remove from within the Settling States within
150 days after the MSA Execution Date all of its (A) billboards (to the extent
that such billboards constitute Outdoor Advertising) advertising Tobacco
Products; (B) signs and placards (to the extent that such signs and placards
constitute Outdoor Advertising) advertising Tobacco Products in arenas,
stadiums, shopping malls and Video Game Arcades; and (C) Transit
Advertisements advertising Tobacco Products.
(2) Prohibition on New Outdoor Advertising and Transit Advertisements.
No Participating Manufacturer may, after the MSA Execution Date, place or
cause to be placed any new Outdoor Advertising advertising Tobacco Products
or new Transit Advertisements advertising Tobacco Products within any Settling
State.
(3) Alternative Advertising. With respect to those billboards required to be
removed under subsection (1) that are leased (as opposed to owned) by any
Participating Manufacturer, the Participating Manufacturer will allow the
Attorney Genera of the Settling State within which such billboards are located to
substitute, at the Settling State's option, alternative advertising intended to
discourage the use of Tobacco Products by Youth and their exposure to second-
hand smoke for the remaining term of the applicable contract (without regard to
any renewal or option term that may be exercised by such Participating
Manufacturer). The Participating Manufacturer will bear the cost of the lease
through the end of such remaining term. Any other costs associated with such
alternative advertising will be borne by the Settling State.
(4) Ban on Agreements Inhibiting Anti-Tobacco Advertising. Each
Participating Manufacturer agrees that it will not enter into any agreement that
prohibits a third party from seling, purchasing or displaying advertising
discouraging the use of Tobacco Products or exposure to second-hand smoke. In
the event and to the extent that any Participating Manufacturer has entered into
an agreement containing any such prohibition, such Participating Manufacturer
agrees to waive such prohibition in such agreement.
(5) Designation of Contact Person. Each participating Manufacturer that
has Outdoor Advertising or Transit Advertisements advertising Tobacco
Products within a Settling State shall, within 10 days after the MSA Execution
Date, provide the Attorney General of such Settling State with the name of a
contact person to whom the Settling State may direct inquiries during the time
such Outdoor Advertising and Transit Advertisements are being eliminated, and
2002] 1003
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The MSA appeared to settle many states' claims against the tobacco
companies." Massachusetts, like forty other states, received monetary
payments from the cigarette industry for their health-related claims, as
well as permanent injunctive relief.1°9  But following the MSA, then
Attorney General of Massachusetts Scott Harshbarger, announced that
before he left office, he would formulate restrictions "in order to 'close
holes' in the settlement agreement and 'to stop Big Tobacco from
recruiting new customers among the children of Massachusetts."' "1  In
January 1999, Harshbarger fulfilled his promise and "promulgated
regulations governing the sale and advertisement of cigarettes, smokeless
tobacco, and cigars.... These regulations, effective February 1, 2000,
were designed to "eliminate deception" in tobacco advertisement, sale,
and distribution, as well as to protect the children of Massachusetts from
accessing the dangerous products.112  The Massachusetts regulations
which were broader in scope than the MSA, placed restrictions on
"outdoor advertising, point-of-sale advertising, retail sales transactions,
from whom the Settling State may obtain periodic reports as to the progress of
their elimination.
(6) Adult-Only Facilities. To the extent that any advertisement advertising
Tobacco Products are located within an Adult-only Facility constitutes Outdoor
Advertising or a Transit Advertisement, this subsection (d) shall not apply to
such advertisement, provided such advertisement is not visible to persons outside
such Adult-Only Facility.
Id.; see also, Luka, supra note 62, at 299 (discussing the MSA's tobacco marketing and
advertising restrictions and whether they pass constitutional scrutiny under the First
Amendment). Luka applies the Central Hudson standard to the MSA and concludes that
most of the restrictions set forth in the Agreement pass constitutional analysis under
Central Hudson and its progeny. Id. Luka concludes that given "the compelling nature of
the government's interest in protecting children and adolescents from the dangers of
smoking and the narrowly tailored approach that a majority of the advertising restrictions
adopt, much of the Master Settlement Agreement will likely withstand judicial scrutiny
under the applicable legal standard." Id. at 318. She further concludes:
Even the restrictions that are constitutionally infirm at present, can be more
narrowly tailored .... The government must continue to develop the record,
adhere to its substantial interest in reducing youth smoking, and pay close
attention to Central Hudson and its progeny in order to be prepared for the
constitutional challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement.
Id.
108. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 107.
109. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 535 (2001).
110. Id. Harshbarger announced his decision to create such regulations in a press
conference following his state's decision to sign the MSA. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 21.01 (2000)); see also supra note 5
(setting forth language of section 21.01).
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transactions by mail, promotions, sampling of products, and labels for
cigars.". 3
A group of cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar manufacturers and
retailers challenged the regulations before they became effective in
2000.114 In seeking summary judgment, the tobacco companies claimed
that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy
Clause, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Massachusetts statute
section 1979, and section 1983 of title forty-two in the U.S. Code."
5
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the FCLAA's preemption provision prohibiting states from
"imposing any 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
... with respect to the advertising or promotion of... cigarettes" was not
applicable to the Massachusetts advertising restrictions because they
were not based on smoking and health."6 Next, the district court applied
the Central Hudson test to the statute and found that the Massachusetts
Attorney General had presented "an adequate basis" for regulating the
tobacco products."' The court held that the outdoor advertising
regulations, which prevent tobacco companies from advertising in close
proximity to places where children may be, did not violate the First
Amendment since they advanced "a substantial government interest"
and were "narrowly tailored to suppress no more speech than
necessary.""' 8 Likewise, the district court deemed Massachusetts' sales
practices regulations to be constitutional since they did not implicate a
"significant speech interest.""' 9 Finally, the district court struck down
Massachusetts' point-of-sale advertising regulations, which required that
indoor advertising of tobacco products be placed at least five feet from
the floor, because the Attorney General failed to justify the regulation.20
113. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534.
114. Id. at 536-37. The plaintiffs in the original lawsuit included Lorillard Tobacco
Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
Philip Morris Incorporated, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company, and several cigar
manufacturers and retailers. Id.
115. Id. at 537.
116. Id. (quoting section 1334(b) of the FCLAA) (omissions in original). Section
1334(b) states:
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on
precedent from the Second and Seventh Circuits to affirm the district
court's holding regarding the FCLAA preemption claim. 2' Regarding
the First Amendment claim, the First Circuit largely agreed with the
district court, but reversed the district court's invalidation of the point-of-
sale regulations finding that the Attorney General is "better suited" to
identify necessary restrictions than the courts1 22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on both the
preemption and the First Amendment claims.'2 The Court first
examined the language and purpose of the FCLAA statute, 24 and
reiterated that "Congress spoke precisely and narrowly" with reference
to the preemption clause of the FCLAA.'2' After thorough discussion of
each of the Massachusetts Attorney General's arguments against
preemption arguments, the majority ultimately held that Congress
"prohibited state cigarette advertising regulations motivated by concerns
about smoking and health.' ' 126  Thus, the Court reversed the First
Circuit's decision regarding the preemption issue. .27 In the Court's view,
no distinction should be made with reference to minors and cigarette
advertising, and "the more general concern about smoking and health in
cigarette advertising," especially when "Congress crafted a legislative
solution for those very concerns."' 8  In holding that the FCLAA
121. Id. at 538-39; see also Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Guiliani, 195
F.3d 100, 103, 105-10 (2d Cir. 1999) (looking at whether a New York City local law entitled
"Youth Protection Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act" was preempted by
the FCLAA and concluding that the local law was only partially preempted); Fed. of
Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 636-40 (7th Cir. 1999)
(analyzing whether a Chicago ordinance that restricts public advertisement of cigarette
products and alcohol was preempted by the FCLAA and holding that a provision in the
ordinance that regulates land use was preempted, while the other provisions pertaining to
traditional local police powers of Chicago were not preempted).
122. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 539.
123. Id. at 540. The Court stated "[w]e granted both petitions to resolve the conflict
among the Courts of Appeals with respect to whether the FCLAA pre-empts cigarette
advertising regulations like those at issue here, and to decide the important First
Amendment issues presented in these cases." Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 542-43 (explaining that the "purpose of the FCLAA was twofold: to inform
the public adequately about the hazards of cigarette smoking, and to protect the national
economy from interference due to diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling
and advertising regulations with respect to the relationship between smoking and health").
125. Id. at 543.
126. Id. at 548.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 550-51. The Court stated that "Congress not only enhanced its scheme to
warn the public about the hazards of cigarette smoking, but also sought to protect the
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preempted the Massachusetts outdoor and point-of-sale advertising
regulations, the Court noted that the FCLAA preemption provision
"governs state regulations of 'advertising or promotion"' and not "all
state regulation of conduct as it relates to the sale or use of cigarettes. ''
A. The Majority Affirms the Central Hudson Approach and Protects
Commercial Speech under an "Intermediate Level of Scrutiny"
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor addressed the tobacco
companies' claim that the Massachusetts regulations violated their First
Amendment right to commercial free speech. '3° Citing Central Hudson,
Justice O'Connor noted that the Central Hudson test is the standard by
which the Court determines whether regulations of commercial speech
are appropriate."' Justice O'Connor acknowledged that some members
of the Court had previously expressed concerns about the Central
Hudson standard.'32 For example, Justice O'Connor cited Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 33 where the petitioners
urged the Court to reject the Central Hudson standard and apply a more
stringent standard to regulations which prohibit advertisement of private
casino gambling broadcasted by radio or television in Louisiana.
34
Without explanation, Justice O'Connor held that Central Hudson
provided an "adequate basis" for looking at the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts regulations, and that a stricter level of scrutiny was
'35
unnecessary.
Given that the Massachusetts Attorney General assumed, for summary
judgment purposes, that the tobacco companies' speech was entitled to
First Amendment protection, the first prong of the Central Hudson test
was not an issue in Lorillard.36 Similarly, because the tobacco companies
did not contest the importance of Massachusetts' interest in preventing
youth from using tobacco products, the second prong of the Central
public, including youth, from being inundated with images of cigarette smoking in
advertising." Id. at 547-48.
129. Id. at 552.
130. Id. at 553.
131. Id. at 553-55.
132. Id. at 554-55.
133. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
134. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. The Lorillard Court saw "no need to break new
ground." Id. In the Court's view, Central Hudson provides an adequate basis for its
decision." Id. at 554-55.
135. -Id.
136. Id. at 555.
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Hudson test was satisfied.3 7 The Lorillard Court focused, therefore, on
the last two prongs of the Central Hudson four-part test.
138
In analyzing the third step, the Court considered the tobacco
companies' argument that while the Massachusetts Attorney General
identified a problem with underage persons smoking cigarettes, he did
not present evidence to suggest that a similar problem existed with
underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. 39 Likewise, the Court
considered the tobacco companies' contention "that the Attorney
General cannot prove that advertising has a causal link to tobacco use
such that limiting advertising will materially alleviate any problem of
underage use of their products.'"'4  Justice O'Connor rejected both
contentions and looked to the Attorney General's reliance on evidence
and data gathered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 4'
Although the Court had recently held that the FDA lacks statutory
authority to regulate tobacco products,'42 Justice O'Connor accepted
FDA studies as valuable evidence to support the Attorney General's
decision to regulate tobacco advertising.' 43  For instance, Justice
O'Connor noted the FDA's finding that a significant percentage of
young children recognized Joe Camel, R.J. Reynolds' Camel brand
cigarette cartoon, and that following the introduction of Joe Camel,
considerably more children began to use Camel cigarettes.'
44
137. Id. at 555-56.
138. Id. at 557 (noting that in concentrating on the last two prongs of the four-part
Central Hudson analysis, the Court would first consider the outdoor advertising and point-
of-sale advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars, and then the sales
practices regulations for all tobacco products).
139. Id. at 556-57.
140. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. at 20-22, Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (Nos. 00-596 and 00-597); Brief for Petitioners
Altadis U.S.A. Inc. at 9-16, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (No. 00-
597).
141. Id. at 557-58.
142. Id. at 558 (referring to FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
161 (2000), where the Court held that upon a full reading of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397, and upon consideration of Congress' subsequent
tobacco-specific legislation, it is clear that Congress has not vested with the FDA the
authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily marked).
143. Id. at 558-59.
144. Id. at 558. The Court further stated that "[t]he FDA also identified trends in
tobacco consumption among certain populations, such as young women, that correlated to
the introduction and marketing of products geared toward that population." Id. at 558-59.
Specifically, the share of the youth market rose from four percent to thirteen percent. Id.
at 558. But see generally JERALD G. BACHMAN ET AL., THE DECLINE OF SUBSTANCE
USE IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD: CHANGES IN SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, ROLE, AND BELIEFS
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With respect to cigars, Justice O'Connor focused on empirical
evidence from the National Cancer Institute (NCI)1 45 and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) because FDA findings related to cigar use by
minors was not available.' The majority concluded that the
Massachusetts Attorney General satisfied the third prong of the Central
Hudson test since the Attorney General "provided ample documentation
of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars."'1 47
Likewise, the majority rejected the tobacco companies' contention that
there is no evidence to suggest that limiting tobacco company advertising
would "decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars."
1
Relying on empirical data, the Court concluded that the decision to




While the Massachusetts Attorney General satisfied the third prong of
the Central Hudson standard, the regulations failed to satisfy the final
prong.o The Court firmly held that the Massachusetts regulations did
(2002). For an analysis of the constitutional implications of banning or limiting the use of
cartoon characters in tobacco advertisements, see Redish, supra note 92, at 627-32.
145. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 560 (stating that the National Cancer Institute "concluded
in its 1998 Monograph that the rate of cigar use by minors is increasing and that, in some
States, the cigar use rates are higher than the smokeless tobacco use rates for minors").
146. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the "Attorney General presents different
evidence with respect to cigars. There was no data on underage cigar use prior to 1996
because the behavior was considered 'uncommon enough not to be worthy of
examination."' Id. Justice O'Connor continued:
In 1995, the FDA decided not to include cigars in its attempted regulation of
tobacco product advertising, explaining that 'the agency does not currently have
sufficient evidence that these products are drug delivery devices .... FDA has
focused its investigation of its authority over tobacco products on cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products and not on pipe tobacco or cigars because young
people predominantly use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.
Id. But see Patricia A. Davidson & Christopher N. Banthin, Untangling the Web: Legal
and Policy Tools to Restrict Online Cigar Advertisement, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000)
(identifying and analyzing the "legal tools for restricting cigar advertising on the
Internet"). According to Davidson and Banthin, "[cligar smoking in the United States
increased sharply throughout much of the 1990s, reversing a thirty-year decline . . . . The
new cigar smokers include those of adolescent age, and even younger children." Id. at 10.
Davidson and Banthin explain that adolescent attraction to cigar use is likely the result of
the "glamorization" of cigar use. Id. at 11. The authors state that "[iun 1997, the Centers
for Disease Control & Protection (CDC) documented surprisingly high cigar smoking
rates among underage teenagers." Id. at 10. Likewise, "[s]ome state studies in 1997 and
1998 revealed that cigar smoking among youths began as early as sixth grade and
increased markedly by the eighth grade and high school." Id.
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not reasonably "fit between the means and ends of the regulatory
scheme," and therefore were not sufficiently narrow to be
constitutional.15" ' The majority believed that the prohibitions on
smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and
playgrounds were substantially overbroad.15 1 In addition, the
Massachusetts regulations would not only significantly prohibit tobacco
companies from advertising outside certain establishments, but would
also restrict advertisements found inside stores if the advertising could be
seen from the outside.' 3 In fact, the majority noted that in some areas
the restrictions on tobacco advertising would amount to "nearly a
complete ban on the communication of truthful information about
smokeless tobacco and cigars to adult consumers."' According to the
Court, the Massachusetts Attorney General simply failed to "carefully
calculate" the speech interests when he determined the impact and scope
of the regulations.1
5
The majority held that while the Massachusetts Attorney General
apparently based its 1,000-foot restriction on commercial speech on the
FDA's decision to impose "an identical 1,000-foot restriction when it
attempted to regulate cigarette and smokeless tobacco advertising," his
basis should have been "case specific" since the effects of such
restrictions would vary by location." 6 The majority also articulated that
151. Id.
152. Id. at 562. The Court set forth the tobacco companies' argument in the district
court. Id. Specifically, the tobacco companies maintained that:
(T]his prohibition would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston,
Worchester, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The 87% to 91% figure appears to
include not only the effect of the regulations, but also the limitations imposed by
other generally applicable zoning restrictions. The Attorney General disputed
petitioners' figures but "concede[d] that the reach of the regulations is
substantial.
Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. The Court also noted that "the regulations restrict advertisements of any size
and the term advertisement also includes oral statements." Id. (citing MAss. REGS. CODE
tit. 940, §§ 21.03, 22.03 (2000)).
154. Id. at 562.
155. Id. at 561.
156. Id. at 562-63. The Court held that a "case specific analysis" is appropriate
because:
[A]lthough a State or locality may have common interests and concerns about
underage smoking and the effects of tobacco advertisements, the impact of a
restriction on speech will undoubtedly vary from place to place. The FDA's
regulations would have had widely disparate effects nationwide. Even in
Massachusetts, the effect of the Attorney General's speech regulations will vary
based on whether a locale is rural, suburban, or urban.
Id. at 563.
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it could find no reason why the Massachusetts regulations must ban oral
communications regarding tobacco products, especially since such a ban
would prevent retailers from responding to "inquiries about its tobacco
products" if those inquiries occurred outside of their retail
establishments. 1
57
The majority also addressed Massachusetts' point-of-sale regulations
15
and concluded that they failed both the third and fourth prongs of the
Central Hudson test.159 The majority held that such restrictions were
unreasonable because the five-foot rule does not directly advance the
state's goal of preventing minors from using tobacco products." The
majority stated, "[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and those who
are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their
surroundings., 16 In sum, Massachusetts failed to establish a reasonable
means to further their goal of protecting youth from indoor advertising.'62
But unlike the outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations, the
majority held that the Massachusetts regulations, which mandated that
individuals wishing to handle and purchase tobacco products must do so
through a salesperson, did not violate free speech under the First
Amendment. 63 The Court reasoned that "[u]nattended displays of
tobacco products present an opportunity for access without the proper
age verification required by law."' 64  The majority articulated that
tobacco retailers' rights were not encroached upon because adults could
still access tobacco products and tobacco products could still be displayed
to customers.' 65 Thus, given that "[t]he means chosen by the State are
157. Id. at 566. (finding that the Attorney General "failed to incorporate [other
considerations] into [its] regulatory scheme"). For example, the Massachusetts regulations
do not provide for the fact that a ban on any outdoor advertising visible from the outside
may present security concerns for certain establishments, such as convenience stores,
which rely on "visibility of the store from the outside." Id.
158. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 21.03 (2000) (defining point-of-sale).
159. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566. The Court noted that the point-of-sale regulations,
MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000), provided that tobacco
advertisements could not "be placed lower than five feet from the floor of any retail
establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of any school or
playground." Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566.
160. Id.
161. Id. While "Massachusetts may wish to target tobacco advertisements and displays
that entice children, much like floor-level candy displays in a convenience store ... the
blanket height restriction does not constitute a reasonable fit with that goal." Id. at 567.
162. Id. at 569.
163. Id. at 567-69 (citing MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.04(2)(c)-(d), 22.06(c)-(d)
(2000)).
164. Id. at 569.
165. Id. at 569-70. The Court stated:
2002] 1011
1012 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 51:987
narrowly tailored to prevent access to tobacco products by minors," and
"are unrelated to expression, and leave open alternative avenues for
vendors to convey information to would-be customers," the Court
concluded that the sales practices regulations withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. '66
B. Justice Thomas' Concurring Opinion: Highlighting the Need for
Stricter Scrutiny
In his lengthy concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the FCLAA preempted the Massachusetts regulations. 67
Justice Thomas also agreed that the regulations failed the intermediate
level of scrutiny posed by the Central Hudson standard. 168 Justice
Thomas wrote a separate opinion to reiterate his belief that strict
scrutiny is appropriate in cases where the government "seeks to restrict
truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys," regardless of
whether the speech can be classified as "commercial."'69  Citing his
partially concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart, Justice Thomas noted that
if the Massachusetts regulations "targeted anything other than
advertising for commercial products . . . all would agree that the
restrictions should be subjected to strict scrutiny.'.'. He also cited
We presume that vendors may place empty tobacco packaging on open display,
and display actual tobacco products so long as that display is only accessible to
sales personnel. As for cigars, there is no indication in the regulations that a
customer is unable to examine a cigar prior to purchase, so long as that
examination takes place through a salesperson.
Id. at 570.
166. Id. at 570.
167. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
168. Id. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia joined, concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment of the Court. Id. at 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Kennedy's concurring opinion highlighted his discomfort with
the Court's application of the third prong of the Central Hudson test. Id. Specifically,
Kennedy's concurrence noted that "[tjhe obvious overbreadth of the outdoor advertising
restrictions suffices to invalidate them under the fourth part of the test in Central
Hudson." Id. Therefore, in Justice Kennedy's view, "there is no need to consider whether
the restrictions satisfy the third part of the test, a proposition about which there is
considerable doubt." Id.
169. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Thomas concluded that he "would subject all of the advertising restrictions to strict
scrutiny." Id. Applying such an analysis, Justice Thomas would find that the restrictions
violate the First Amendment. Id.
170. Id. at 575 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Thomas stated, "[i]n my view, an asserted government interest in keeping people ignorant
by suppressing expression 'is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of
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Justices Stevens' opinion in 44 Liquormart, which stated that "[w]hen a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands." ' According to
Justice Thomas, Massachusetts did not seek to regulate tobacco company
advertising because it wanted to preserve a fair bargaining process.172
Instead, Justice Thomas believed that Massachusetts was concerned with
tobacco use being portrayed as a desirable activity and simply wanted to
prevent minors from being encouraged to purchase tobacco products.'73
Justice Thomas addressed several problems with Massachusetts'
position.'74 First, he highlighted Massachusetts' choice to implement
regulations that did not focus on "youthful imagery."' 75  Instead, the
Massachusetts' regulations applied equally to "torpor, homeliness, and
servility."'76 Second, Justice Thomas argued that the regulations were
grossly overbroad because they would prohibit stores from
communicating truthful information, such as the price of their
cigarettes." Regarding Massachusetts' argument that tobacco
advertisements "may be restricted because they propose an illegal sale of
tobacco to minors," Justice Thomas declared that Massachusetts' ability
to castigate speech, which fosters crime, is not in any way related to "the
commercial speech than it can justify regulation of noncommercial speech."' Id. (internal
quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing to
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 577-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Thomas stated that:
In an effort to avoid the implications of these basic principles of First
Amendment law, respondents make two principal claims. First, they argue that
the regulations target deceptive and misleading speech. Second, they argue that
the regulations restrict speech that promotes an illegal transaction - i.e., the sale
of tobacco to minors.
Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 577-79 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
175. Id. at 578 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court
noted that the "[r]espondents suggest that tobacco advertising is misleading because 'its
youthful imagery and ... sheer ubiquity' leads children to believe 'that tobacco use is
desirable and pervasive."' Id. Justice Thomas said that "[t]his justification is belied.., by
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commercial character of the speech." '78  Given the Massachusetts
regulations would limit "all tobacco advertising ... because some of its
viewers may not legally act on it," Justice Thomas rejected the state's
argument. 79 Finally, Justice Thomas stressed that Massachusetts could
not restrict speech to protect its youth at the expense of infringing upon
the free speech right of adults.' 8 He referenced the Court's holding in
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,' where the Court held that speech "cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."'" In Justice Thomas'
opinion, strict scrutiny must be applied to the Massachusetts regulations
and heightened scrutiny cannot be avoided simply because the
regulations aim to protect children.'
Justice Thomas concluded that if strict scrutiny were applied, the
Massachusetts regulations would be unconstitutional.' 84 Although the
state claims that it has a compelling interest "in reducing tobacco use
among minors," Justice Thomas agreed with the majority and stated that
a ban on point-of-sale advertising below five feet does not protect minors
from seeing tobacco advertisements.' Similarly, Justice Thomas
remained unconvinced that restrictions on cigar and smokeless tobacco
outdoor advertising "promote any state interest."' 6  Justice Thomas
discounted the First Circuit's dependence on an NC report, which noted
an increase in cigar use by youth."" Additionally, he noted that cigar
178. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating
that "it is often the case that solicitation to commit a crime is entirely noncommercial").
Justice Thomas also stated that:
The harm that the State seeks to prevent is the harm caused by the unlawful
activity that is solicited; it is unrelated to the commercial transaction itself. Thus
there is no reason to apply anything other than our usual rule for evaluating
solicitation and incitement simply because the speech in question happens to be
commercial.
Id. (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 580 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
180. Id.
181. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
182. Id. at 213-14 (cited in Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 581 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)).
183. Id. at 582 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Thomas stated that "[f]ar from serving a compelling interest, the ban on displays below
five feet seems to lack even a minimally rational relationship to any conceivable interest."
ld.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 583-84 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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makers simply do not use billboards in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to advertise, and "in fact their nationwide outdoor
advertising budget is only about $50,000 per year.' 8 Justice Thomas
concluded that Massachusetts' ban on cigar advertising would have no
effect on preventing cigar use by underage youth.'
Justice Thomas also noted that even if Massachusetts could make a
"compelling state interest" argument, its regulations simply were not
"narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest."O Agreeing with the
majority that the 1,000-foot radius regulation "demonstrates a lack of
narrow tailoring," Justice Thomas concluded that "the problem goes
deeper than that."' 9' He suggested that the radius was grossly over-
inclusive because it would include "all but 10 percent of the area in the
three largest cities in the State."' ' Likewise, Justice Thomas noted that
the term "advertisement" in the Massachusetts regulations was simply
too broad because it would cover "anything a tobacco retailer might
say. ' '  For example, the regulations might preclude an owner of a
tobacco shop from displaying the name of his business outside of his
store . '94 Justice Thomas also suggested that Massachusetts had several
alternatives to combat an increase in tobacco use by underage youth. 95
For instance, instead of attempting to limit tobacco companies from
advertising their products, Massachusetts "could seek to counteract that
message" by promoting more free speech rather than more silence.' 96
188. Id. at 583.
189. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (pointing
out that the report on cigar smoking used by the respondents, "candidly acknowledges"
that more information is needed to learn how much cigar use really affects youth).
190. Id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Thomas reasoned:
Consider, for example, a billboard located within 1,000 feet of a school but
visible only from an elevated freeway that runs nearby. Such a billboard would
not threaten any of the interests respondents assert, but it would be banned
anyway, because the regulations take no account of whether the advertisement
could even be seen by children. The prohibited zone is even more suspect where,




194. Id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
195. Id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
196. Id. Justice Thomas also noted that Massachusetts could attempt to enact its own
laws "prohibiting the purchase, possession, or use of tobacco by minors." Id.
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Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the idea that tobacco and tobacco use
is somehow a "special" topic and therefore deserving of less First
Amendment protection. 97 Justice Thomas contrasted the serious health
risks of tobacco use with obesity, the second largest contributor to death
in the United States, and pointed out that fast food chains enjoy First
Amendment protection and freely advertise their food products. 98
Similarly, Justice Thomas stated that while the sale and consumption of
alcohol is illegal for persons under the age of twenty-one in every state,
children are frequently exposed to alcohol advertising99 Justice Thomas
concluded that a vice exception to the First Amendment does not exist.2'
In Justice Thomas' opinion, every state legislature must recognize that
even potentially harmful activities deserve and enjoy significant First
Amendment protection.2°'
C. The Minority Opinion: Essentially Reaffirming the Majority's First
Amendment Conclusions
While Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter strongly
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the FCLAA preempted the
Massachusetts regulations, the minority opinion largely agreed with the
majority's First Amendment conclusions.2  The minority opinion
197. Id. at 586-87 (stating that "[u]nderlying many of the arguments of respondents
and their amici is the idea that tobacco is in some sense sui generis - that it is so special,
so unlike any other object of regulation, that application of normal First Amendment
principles should be suspended").
19& Id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
199. Id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 590 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
202. Id. at 590-91 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, writing for the minority opinion, found that the
FCLAA could not preempt the Massachusetts regulations. Id. at 591. He reasoned:
As the regulations at issue in this suit implicate two powers that lie at the heart of
the States' traditional police power-the power to regulate land usage and the
power to protect the health and safety of minors-our precedents require that
the Court construe the preemption provision "narrow[ly]." If Congress' intent to
preempt a particular category of regulation is ambiguous, such regulations are
not preempted.
Id. at 591-92 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part).
Justice Stevens further reasoned that the text of the FCLAA preemption provision
must be viewed "in context" and the Court must look to the "history, structure, and
purpose of the regulatory scheme in which it appears." Id. at 592 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens concluded
that "Congress did not intend to preempt state and local regulations of the location of
cigarette advertising when it adopted the provision at issue in this suit." Id. Stevens
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concurred with the majority and found that the advertising restrictions
imposed by Massachusetts were designed for the legitimate state interest
of reducing tobacco use by minors.2°3 Moreover, the minority opinion
concurred with the majority's holding that the record did not support
Massachusetts' claim that the restrictions imposed by the statute "were
properly tailored to serve those interests. '" '  The minority opinion
expressed concern about the possibility that adults may be precluded
from communicating with each other if regulations such as
Massachusetts' 1,000-foot rule were upheld.205 The minority opinion also
explained that the state must "find the appropriate balance" between
protecting children from exposure to harmful material and ensuring that
adults maintain the ability to receive truthful information.2c
traced the history of the FCLAA's preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Id. at 592-
93 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
In 1964, the Report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and
Health concluded that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the
United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). In 1965, Congress enacted
the FCLAA to inform the public of the dangers of cigarette smoking and to protect that
national economy from interference due to "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health." Id at 593 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1331). In 1969, Congress enacted the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which made three changes to the FCLAA. Id. at 544.
Congress drafted a new "warning" label to be placed on cigarette packages and "declared
it unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium of electronic communication subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission." Id. Congress also enacted
the current preemption provision of the FCLAA which proscribes any "requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health.., with respect to the advertising or promotion
of cigarettes." Id. at 594 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
1984, Congress amended the FCLAA when it passed the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act in an effort to "provide a new strategy for making Americans more aware
of any adverse health effects of smoking, to assure the timely and widespread
dissemination of research findings and to enable individuals to make informed decisions
about smoking." Id. at 545. The current FCLAA provision, codified as 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b), preempts any "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... with
respect to the advertising or promotion of ... cigarettes." Id at 546.
203. Id. at 591 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
206. Id. Justice Stevens explained that he shared that the majority's concern "as to
whether the 1,000-foot rule unduly restricts the ability of cigarette manufacturers to
convey lawful information to adult consumers." Id. He concluded that it is "a question of
line-drawing." Id. Justice Stevens further noted that "[w]hile a ban on all
communications about a given subject would be the most effective way to prevent children
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While the minority shared the majority's concern that the 1,000-foot
rule was unduly restrictive, they reasoned that "whether the regulatory
scheme leaves available sufficient 'alternative avenues of
communication,"' cannot be determined by reviewing the record . 7
Therefore, the minority would opt to vacate the summary judgment
award upholding the 1,000-foot rule and remand the case to the
Massachusetts district court for trial on that issue. 218 In support of this
argument, the minority opinion questioned the statistical evidence within
the record.2°9 The minority noted that while the evidence suggested that
eighty or ninety percent of certain urban areas may be unavailable to
tobacco advertisements, it is possible that the remaining percentage of
the areas could be so heavily traveled that tobacco companies would
have a "sufficient forum" to convey their messages."O Likewise, the
minority reiterated that tobacco companies maintain alternate means of
communicating information about their products through print
advertising, circulars, or even by "word of mouth."2"' Despite the
minority's opinion that the case should be vacated and remanded, it
mostly concurred with the First Amendment holdings and reasoning set
forth by Justice O'Connor in the majority opinion. 212
from exposure to such material, the state cannot by fiat reduce the level of discourse to
that which is 'fit for children." Id. (citations omitted).
207. Id. (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated that while he agreed with the majority that the
court of appeals neglected to and insufficiently considered the implications of the 1,000-
foot rule "for the lawful communication of adults," he further noted:
There is no doubt that the 1,000-foot rule prohibits cigarette advertising in a
substantial portion of Massachusetts' largest cities. Even on that question,
however, the parties remain in dispute as to the percentage of these urban areas
that is actually off limits to tobacco advertising. Moreover, the record is entirely
silent on the impact of the regulation in other portions of the Commonwealth.
The dearth of reliable statistical information as to the scope of the ban is
problematic.
Id.
209. Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
211. Id. Justice Stevens noted "[f]or example, depending on the answers to empirical
questions on which we lack data, the ubiquity of print advertisements hawking particular
brands of cigarettes might suffice to inform adult consumers of the special advantages of
the respective brands." Id.
212. Id. at 599-602 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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III. DOES THE REAFFIRMATION OF COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
LEAVE STATES POWERLESS IN THEIR EFFORT TO PROTECT THEIR
YOUTH?
A. The Court Achieved a Sound Outcome By Favoring Consistency
The issue in Lorillard was not whether the Central Hudson test
remains the means by which to address the constitutionality of state
restrictions on the advertising of vice products, but the extent to which
the state must go in order to pass the standard. While the Court's use of
the standard has historically varied,213 the majority opinion conclusively
rejected any effort to heighten or lower the standard used to address the
constitutionality of regulations which restrict commercial expression.1
More significantly, only Justice Thomas questioned the appropriateness
of Central Hudson's apparent "intermediate scrutiny" standard in
Lorillard.2"5 Although Justice Thomas called for strict scrutiny any time
the government seeks to "restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the
ideas it conveys," he acknowledged that the application of Central
Hudson produced the appropriate outcome in Lorillard.16 By applying
the Central Hudson test, the Court found that the overbroad
Massachusetts regulations infringed upon the tobacco companies' First
Amendment right to free speech."' Given that eight out of nine Justices
neither discussed nor questioned the soundness of the standard, Lorillard
affirmed that Central Hudson is the means by which commercial free
speech issues are analyzed.218
Beyond affirming the Central Hudson test, Lorillard promoted the
need for consistency in the restriction or regulation of commercial free
speech.2 9 As Justice Thomas noted, tobacco companies' rights to
advertise their products cannot be infringed upon because states seek to
curb tobacco use by underage youth 20  If states were permitted to
restrict everything which is potentially dangerous to youth, legislatures
would be able to prevent fast food chains from advertising their food
213. See supra note 78 (describing the historical misapplication of the Central Hudson
test).
214. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-55. Justice O'Connor noted that Central Hudson is an
adequate standard, and that the petitioners' argument that it should be rejected and that
stricter scrutiny should apply is without merit. Id.
215. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 571.
218. Id. at 554-55.
219. Id. (holding that "Central Hudson... provides an adequate basis for decision").
220. Id. at 580 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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products because they are high in fat and lead to both obesity and a host
of other harmful medical problems.2' Likewise, legislatures would be
able to restrict any alcohol advertising since those who drink alcohol at a
young age "are much more likely to become dependent on alcohol" later
in life.m Therefore, as Justice Thomas reasoned, consistency must
outweigh any effort to seek a vice exception to the First Amendment.2
B. States Maintain Alternative Ways to Protect the Youth Population
The Lorillard decision did not leave Massachusetts without a means to
224protect its youth from the dangers of tobacco use. In fact, Justice
Thomas' opinion offered Massachusetts several constitutionally sound
alternatives by which it could promote healthy behavior among its
youth.224 For example, because Massachusetts prohibits tobacco use by
underage youth, the state could seek to enforce its laws more
vigorously. 26  Likewise, instead of attempting to restrict speech,
Massachusetts and other states could counteract the messages made by
commercial entities like tobacco companies with messages of their own. 272
For instance, for every "pro-smoking" advertisement produced, the state
could implement an "anti-smoking" advertisement.m Finally, by
221. Id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). To
support this conclusion, Justice Thomas referred to Ali H. Mokdad et al., The Spread of
the Obesity Epidemic in the United States, 1991-1998, 282 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1519, 1520
(1999).
222. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). See generally Karen L. Sterchi, Restraints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising:
A Constitutional Analysis, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 779, 781 (1985) (discussing the role
alcohol advertising plays in the consumption and abuse of alcohol by persons, including
youth, and examining the constitutional implications of restricting alcohol advertisements
under Central Hudson).
223. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 589-90 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
224. Id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also Shari Roan, Struggle to Quit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14,2000, at S1 (finding
that a surprising number of teens want to quit smoking but are having a difficult time
doing so because the programs designed to help are geared more toward adults than kids);
Judy Silber, Youths Smoke Out Truth in Advertising, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at B3
(describing an Orange County, California youth anti-tobacco program called the "Tune
Out Tobacco," where children learn to analyze the advertisements of cigarette companies
and design their own anti-tobacco advertisements).
228. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); see also, Redish, supra note 92, at 625-26. Redish sets forth other alternatives
to permitting a total ban on tobacco advertising. Id. He states:
An arguably less invasive alternative to a total ban is the imposition of so-called
"tombstone" limitations. One form of these restrictions allows tobacco
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promoting increased education programs in schools and public-
sponsored youth programs, states like Massachusetts could battle the
"myth" that smoking is a "glamorous" hobby and make its harmful
health effects known. 229
Moreover, if states seek to implement anti-tobacco advertising
regulations, they should do so with Central Hudson's fourth prong in
mind. That is, state regulations must not be grossly overbroad.23
States should be able to seek restrictions which would preclude tobacco
advertisements immediately around parks and schools, but may not
pursue regulations which would preclude the presence of tobacco
advertising to include only brand name, price, and tar and nicotine levels.
Neither promotional text, colors, nor photographs are permitted. Another less
restrictive form imposes a "text-only" requirement, allowing promotional
argument but prohibiting the use of color or imagery. Tombstone limitations
may be thought to be less problematic, from a free speech perspective, than a
total ban, for the obvious reason that they at least permit some basic
communication concerning the product. This fact, however, should not be
allowed to obscure the significant interference with the free speech right to which
tombstone limitations give rise.
Id.
Redish further explains that there are two First Amendment problems associated with
"tombstone limitations." Id. at 626. First, "they interfere with a speaker's choice of
method of expression," and second, "they stifle the expression of particular viewpoints."
Id. Ultimately, Redish concludes that "tombstone limitations may actually be even more
pernicious than a total ban on tobacco advertising" because "they give the illusion of
allowing communication while in reality significantly interfering with the message
conveyed by that communication." Id. at 627. Therefore, they should not be deemed a
constitutionally sound alternative to a total ban on tobacco advertising. Id.; see also
Aileen Cho, Countywide Youngsters React to Anti-Smoking Ads, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1994, at B2 (reporting that a one-year study of 304 seventh-graders in Orange County and
Los Angeles, California found that youth exposure to anti-smoking advertisements helped
the students think of smoking as "immature and unglamourous").
229. See Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Youth Tobacco Surveillance -
United States, 2000, 50 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION SUMMARIES,
No. SS-4, at 1 (Nov. 2, 2001). The CDC concludes that:
Tobacco use is the single leading preventable cause of death in the United States,
accounting for approximately 430,000 deaths each year. The prevalence of
cigarette smoking nationwide among high school students increased during the
1990s, peaking during 1996-1997, then began a gradual decline. Approximately
80% of tobacco users initiate use before age 18 years. If the trend in early
initiation of cigarette smoking continues, approximately 5 million children aged
< 18 years who are living today will die prematurely because they began to
smoke cigarettes during adolescence. The economic costs associated with
tobacco use ranges from $53 billion to $73 billion per year in medical expenses
and $47 billion in lost productivity.
Id.
230. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-55.
231. Id. at 554.
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advertisements inside stores if they can be viewed from the outside.2
Likewise, states should avoid random height restrictions such as the five-
foot rule announced in Lorillard, because their usefulness is
questionable. 33  Finally, regulations that require customers to have
contact with a salesperson in order to verify their age before purchasing
tobacco products are not overbroad. m  In fact, since such required
interaction does not prevent adults from accessing tobacco products,
states should be able to include such a provision in their well-reasoned
tobacco advertisement restrictions.
While each opinion in Lorillard focused on the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts regulations and whether they specifically deserved First
Amendment protection under the Central Hudson test, Lorillard
acknowledged Massachusetts' admirable interest in protecting its youth
from the dangers of harmful products.2-6 In doing so, however, the Court
never lost sight of the state's ability to do more than restrict commercial
speech expression in order to achieve its objective237 States should be
more proactive in looking for constitutionally sound ways to promote
their children's healthy behavior. 28
IV. CONCLUSION
With the increase of smoking levels among the American youth
population, as well as the onslaught of medical studies that conclusively
show that tobacco use is inherently unhealthy, states such as
Massachusetts have attempted to regulate their childrens' exposure to
tobacco advertising2 9 Even though a state's reason for restricting such
advertising might be well-supported, such restrictions are not
automatically afforded constitutional protection. While this might seem
troublesome to some lawmakers, it serves as a reminder of the strength
and breadth of the First Amendment protection afforded to free speech.
In fact, although American society may look unfavorably at tobacco
232. Id. at 565-66.
233. Id. at 566.
234. Id. at 570.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 561.
237. See supra notes 225-229 (setting forth constitutionally sound state alternatives to a
complete ban on tobacco advertisements).
23& See, e.g., Roan, supra note 227 (noting that states may not be providing youth
with adequate programs to help them quit smoking).
239. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572-73 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (outling the anti-tobacco advertising regulations implemented by the
Massachusetts Attorney General).
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company advertisements which seem to lure children in adopting
unhealthy habits, these companies are commercial entities which enjoy
significant free speech protection under the First Amendment.
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